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This special Symposium Edition of the Texas A&M Law Review
contains selected articles from presenters at the Fall Symposium
entitled New Technology and Old Law:  Rethinking National Security
held at the Texas A&M School of Law on October 17, 2014.  The
symposium brought together some of the country’s leading scholars
and practitioners on issues related to national security.  Symposium
participants specifically examined the challenges presented to existing
domestic and international-legal frameworks to adapt to emerging
national security threats. Panelists provided critical analysis of major
issues including the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/drones,
big data and mass surveillance, cyber security and issues of privacy,
the growth of asymmetric warfare, and challenges from new coalitions
such as ISIS/ISIL.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term national security is one that means many things to many
people, whether policymakers or average citizens,1 despite the fact
1. See Arnold Wolfers, National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, 57 POL. SCI.
Q. 481 (1952).
581
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that the “term national security . . . is well enough established in the
political discourse of international relations.”2  In its most broad and
somewhat simplistic sense, “national security” is a collective term en-
compassing both national defense and foreign relations in the United
States.  Specifically, as some have defined it, national security is the
condition provided by (1) military or defense advantage over any for-
eign nation or group of nations; (2) favorable foreign relations posi-
tion; or (3) defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or
destructive action from within or without—whether overt or covert.3
Thus, a nation is “secure” when it is “not in danger of having to sacri-
fice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged,
to maintain” those values through use of force.4  None of these defini-
tions, debated vigorously throughout United States history, are com-
pletely on point, yet they help frame the general discussion that
occurred during the Symposium and which is further developed in this
edition.
As we solidly enter the 21st century—in which every day seems to
bring news of some significant potential threat to our national secur-
ity—policymakers, stakeholders, and we as citizens are being asked to
re-examine our legal, social, economic, and military structures to de-
termine whether they are sufficient to meet the goals, challenges, and
ideals of the coming months, years, and decades.  And, as part of
those examinations, we are examining our core values and asking how
they influence our national security.
In this era of modernity, every day not only brings exciting ad-
vances in technology, science, and human understanding, but also
news of collective threats—be they foreign or domestic, natural or
manmade, that challenge our “national security.”  These events not
only seem prolific but seem to challenge our very foundations of gov-
ernment and defense with such speed that at times we seem almost
incapable of responding or adapting despite the virtual explosion of
access to information and intelligence that has occurred over the past
two decades.  As Dr. Henry A. Kissinger stated before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, “The United States has not faced a more
diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World
War.”5 Secretary Madeleine K. Albright echoed these observations,
“It does not take a seasoned observer of international relations to
2. Id. at 483.
3. WILLIAM M. ARKIN ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. MILITARY 444
(1990).
4. Wolfers, supra note 1, at 484 (citing WALTER LIPPMANN, U.S. FOREIGN POL-
ICY: SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC 51 (1943)).
5. Global Challenges and the U.S. National Security Strategy Before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. 5, at 31 (2015), http://www.armed-services
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-05%20-%201-29-15.pdf (opening statement of Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman of Kissenger Associates and former Secretary of State)
[hereinafter Senate Armed Services Testimony].
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point out that we are living through a time of monumental change
across the world.”6
We are not operating in an absolute vacuum, however.  As Presi-
dent Obama noted in his 2010 National Security Strategy report:
“Time and again in our Nation’s history, Americans have risen to
meet—and to shape—moments of transition.”7  Obama’s remarks
echo the sentiments of President Bush in his 2006 National Strategy
Report when he noted that as a nation “[w]e have seen great accom-
plishments, confronted new challenges, and refined our approach as
conditions changed” in a way that both presidents would agree is in-
spired by the ideals of our history—freedom, democracy, and human
dignity.  Dr. Kissinger expressed a similar position noting that, despite
the myriad challenges to our national security, “[b]y any standard of
national capacity, [the United States is] in a position to achieve our
objectives and to shape international relations.”8
America’s last two presidents, while having vastly different perspec-
tives on foreign and national policy, have both recognized within their
national security strategies that we are in unprecedented times of
globalization.  And we have seen the good that can come from such
globalization—advances in medicine, technologies, and the peaceful
spreading and growing of democracies throughout the world.  We also
have witnessed the dark side of globalization—the intrusiveness of
technology on privacy and other civil liberties, the rise of cyber
threats, external threats from natural disasters and disease, and the
threats that come from those suffering under inequality, economic in-
stability, and religious extremism.  Secretary Albright recently com-
mented on these two sides of globalization: “[The United States is]
reckoning with new forces that are pushing humanity down the path
of progress, while also unleashing new contradictions on the world
scene.”9
Thus our “interconnectedness” has made our national security all
the more dependent on our role in the world and the choices we
make.  On the one hand, do we display confidence and perhaps a
sense of isolationism as suggested by President Bush’s national secur-
ity strategy? Or, do we, as President Obama has said, face the world
as it is and work within it?  Do we use what has made us great in the
past—sturdy alliances, an unmatched military, the world’s largest
economy, a strong and evolving democracy, and a dynamic citizenry to
protect and strengthen our national security?  As Secretary Albright
6. Id. at 9 (statement of Secretary Madeleine K. Albright, Chair of the National
Democratic Institute and former Secretary of State).
7. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, WHITE HOUSE 12 (2010), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
8. Senate Armed Services Testimony, supra note 5, at 30 (opening statement of
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger).
9. Id. at 9 (statement of Secretary Madeleine K. Albright).
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stated in her testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
“We are the only nation with not just the capacity and will to lead, but
also the ideals to do so in a direction that most of the world would
prefer to go—towards liberty and justice, peace, and economic oppor-
tunity for all.”10
In the legal profession, success (and failure) is measured, at least in
part, by our ability to analogize our client’s particular set of facts to
those of previous cases—precedent—to show how our case should fit
within the established framework.  We prefer certainty—a framework
with few surprises that can predict the legal future by relying on the
legal past.  And in those instances where an opinion or decision takes
us in new directions, we often claim that it is not in fact avulsive but
rather a logical outcome from all that has come before.
But the question becomes, particularly in the national security con-
text, is this gradual, carefully calibrated, and measured approach to
building a legal framework that will guide, protect, and foster our na-
tional security always the right approach?  How do we ensure embodi-
ment of and adherence to the basic principles of humanity and
democracy that our Founding Fathers valued in the Constitution in a
21st century world that is so vastly different than anything we could
have perhaps imagined even fifty years ago?
Simply stated—and again to borrow from the law of property—
should our national security legal framework be one based on avul-
sion or accretion?   Is there some happy medium, and if there is, how
do we get there?11  These are some of the larger themes and questions
addressed during the Symposium and throughout the pieces in this
edition.
10. Id. at 10–11.
11. During both the Senate and House Armed Services Committee hearings on
the United States national security strategy, witnesses testified that a successful na-
tional security strategy must be one that does not simply react to the crisis of the day
or month, but rather be focused on long-term priorities and commitments. See, e.g.,
Global Challenges and the U.S. National Security Strategy Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 115th Cong. 3, at 37 (2015) (testimony of William J. Fallon) (“We
should resist reactive responses and attempts to find near term fixes for pop issues
which arise continuously and compete for attention with what we should determine
are higher priority interests”), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
15-03%20-%201-27-15.pdf.  Examining the strength of our national security legal
framework is in keeping with this advice.  Similarly, in the 2015 National Security
Strategy, President Obama noted that in order to succeed in securing Americans, “we
must draw upon the power of our example—that means viewing our commitment to
our values and the rule of law as a strength, and not an inconvience.”  Barack Obama,
Preface to 2015 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, WHITEHOUSE (2015), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.
pdf [hereinafter 2015 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
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II. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, BIG DATA, AND THE
THREAT TO PRIVACY
Intelligence gathering operations—both U.S. and international—
have never been greater. Lieutenant General William C. Mayville, Jr.,
the Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified
before the House Armed Services Committee that the demand for
intelligence, both on and off the battlefield, is “insatiable.”12   In the
digital age, average citizens routinely throw around the term “big
data” as they upload pictures to Instagram, change their status on
Facebook, and follow their favorite celebrities on Twitter.  We are vol-
untarily and mandatorily under surveillance in virtually every aspect
of our lives.
In their piece, Security, Privacy, and Technology Development:  The
Impact on National Security, Abraham R. Wagner and Paul Finkelman
introduce us to the “revolution” and “evolution” of modern communi-
cations and information technology: the growth of big data and its im-
pact on our ideas of privacy and security.  The authors note, “For most
of history people have had very little to keep private.  Literacy was
limited, communications were costly and even more limited, and there
was no Big Data.”13  Wagner and Finkelman explore not only the de-
velopment of big data but how we, as users and used, have changed
our views of privacy and security in the age of modern communica-
tions. Wagner and Finkelman provide the constitutional and legal un-
derpinnings of our idea of “privacy” and how technology—from the
dawn of the photograph to the age of Snapchat—has altered our view
of “privacy” and the legal doctrines that protect it.
Wagner and Finkelman posit, “in many respects the legal regime
[with respect to privacy] is several generations behind current technol-
ogy and how it is being utilized.”14  In their words, “the United States
has been incredibly tardy in passing legislation responding to new In-
ternet technology.”15  They point to several key areas in which the
United States could be more robust in its national security and privacy
efforts:  understanding and appreciating threats from cyber warfare;
recognition of the role of cyberspace in a dynamic world; building a
better technological base through significant higher education efforts
in the field of technology; funding more security initiatives for the
cyber world—particularly as the U.S. federal government is the larg-
est user of the Internet; and exploring more robust and engaged part-
12. Lieutenant General William C. Mayville, Jr., Oral Testimony, House Armed
Services Committee on Worldwide Threats (Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://armedser
vices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=9894B134-0765-484C-
AB5F-882D4410ACD2.
13. Abraham R. Wagner & Paul Finkelman, Security, Privacy, and Technology
Development: The Impact on National Security, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 597, 611 (2015).
14. Id. at 612.
15. Id. at 614.
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nerships with private industry, including a “national policy and legal
regime that recognizes the role that industry [technology such as serv-
ers and clouds] ha[s] in maintaining Big Data and protecting both the
privacy of users and security of their data.”16
The issues associated with big data and our legal framework dis-
cussed by Wagner and Finkelman are inherent in our national security
strategy.  According to documents provided to media outlets by Ed-
ward Snowden, the Fiscal Year 2013 National Security Assessment,
which had never before been released publicly, the U.S. has funded a
$52.6 billion intelligence gathering operation spanning sixteen agen-
cies and comprising of over 100,000 employees.17  Given this labyrinth
of surveillance, how do we protect from the types of intrusion and
government overreach that James Madison might have included in his
observation:  “Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe
there are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of people
by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violent
and sudden usurpations.”18
III. TRADITIONAL THREATS FROM NON-TRADITIONAL SOURCES
The threat from traditional national security challenges such as nu-
clear war and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in rogue
nations continue to top the priorities of our national security appara-
tus.  According to the 2015 National Security Strategy, “No threat
poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential
use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or ter-
rorists.”19  Some have suggested that, at least with respect to nuclear
conflict, “everything on this side of the nuclear divide is new.”20  But it
may be that it is not so much that the threat is new as it is that, like our
ability to access information far faster and in far greater quantities
than ever before imagined, the material is more readily available.21
16. Id. at 632.
17. Barton Gellman & Gregg Miller, ‘Black Budget’ Summary Details U.S. Spy
Network’s Successes, Failures and Objectives, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-
spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-
bcdc09410972_story.html.
18. 11 James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Convention, Richmond, Virginia
(June 6, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON  78, 79 (Robert A. Rutland &
Charles F. Hobson eds., 1978).
19. 2015 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 11.
20. Peter Paret, Introduction to MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY: FROM
MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 7 (Peter Paret et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY].
21. 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
WHITEHOUSE 20 (2006), available at http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf
(noting that “nuclear weapons represent a 60-year old technology and the knowledge
[for creating such weapons] is widespread”) [hereinafter 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY].
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“Cold War stockpiles remain.  More nations have acquired nuclear
weapons . . . . Black markets trade in nuclear secrets and materials.”22
It is far “easier” now for terrorist or other rogue entities to obtain
nuclear material—thus making a threat of terrorist attack using a
WMD one of the greatest.23  This access to materials has resulted in
terrorists being more “determined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear
weapon.”24
These threats are not necessarily “new” in the typical sense of the
word, but the way in which they threaten our national security can be
perceived as such.  Dr. Kissinger addressed this in his opening re-
marks to the Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearing on Global
Challenges and the U.S. National Security Strategy, “[T]he nature of
strategy has shifted—from an emphasis on objective strength, to in-
clude a major component defined by psychological contests and asym-
metric war.”25
As one would expect, the intelligence community grew considerably
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  As Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James Clapper noted in his response to the Wash-
ington Post’s release of the 2013 National Security Assessment:
The United States has made a considerable investment in the Intel-
ligence Community since the terror attacks of 9/11, a time which
includes wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, and asym-
metric threats in such areas as cyber-warfare.26
More access to the underlying material or “know-how” is an ongo-
ing threat to national security and the delivery methods that raise
questions about the adaptability of our legal framework and national
security infrastructure to respond to 21st century threats.  As Tung
Yin explains in his piece, Game of Drones: Defending Against Drone
Terrorism, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the use of air-
planes as terror-delivery systems had appeared in at least two block-
buster novels.27  Novels, movies, and television programs all present
scenarios in which “dirty bombs” explode in crowded sports arenas or
at other public events.
Imagine this scenario:
It is a cold, rainy night in January.  At approximately 3:00 a.m., the
entire White House complex is locked down, Secret Service agents are
22. 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, WHITEHOUSE 23 (2010).
23. 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 21, at 18; 2010 NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 23.
24. 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 22, at 23.
25. Senate Armed Services Testimony, supra note 5, at 30 (opening statement of
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger).
26. Gellman & Miller, supra note 17.
27. Tung Yin, Game of Drones: Defending Against Drone Terrorism, 2 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 635, 637–38 (2015).
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scrambled, and emergency personnel and other law enforcement de-
scend upon the Southeast entrance to the White House.  The threat?
A two-foot-long “quadcopter” drone that crashed onto the White
House lawn.
Another plot in a novel?  No.  On January 26, 2015, a civilian acciden-
tally crashed a private drone on the White House grounds causing its
security apparatus to go on full alert.  While a harmless accident, the
drone intrusion exposed significant weaknesses in White House secur-
ity and our ability to respond to threats from such a non-traditional
source.
It is exactly such an occurrence that Yin considers in his piece.
Yin’s analysis is incredibly timely in light of this most recent breach of
White House security, as it provides an important overview of the
threat posed by domestic drone terrorism and “the technological and
legal issues involved in setting up defensive responses” to it.28  As Yin
explains, when the U.S. introduced the era of “weaponized drone war-
fare” it also “opened Pandora’s Box” to the possibility that the
“United States may soon find itself on the wrong end of a weaponized
drone.”29
Yin’s piece is prescient in its review of existing laws and regulations
regarding private (civilian) drones and proposals “to develop the legal
and technological architecture to defend against drone terrorism.” As
Senator Charles Schumer announced the day after the White House
incident, “There is no stronger sign that clear FAA guidelines for
drones are needed.”30
The flipside of the domestic drone threat is, of course, that un-
manned aerial vehicles, or “remotely piloted vehicles” as they are
called by the United States Air Force, have become an important part
of the U.S. weapons arsenal.  In David E. Graham’s piece, The U.S.
Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Abandonment
of Applicable International Norms, Graham explores the use of drones
as a weapons system by the United States.31  Both Yin and Graham
note that the dialogue surrounding the use of drone technology often
blurs between a discussion of the system itself and the policies sup-
porting its use.32  Graham posits in his piece that if there is any per-
ceived uncertainty about the legitimacy of the system or whether
current legal norms (both international and domestic) are sufficient to
28. Id. at 638.
29. Id. at 636.
30. Man Claims Responsibility for Drone Crash at White House, Says was an Acci-
dent, FOX NEWS (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/26/obama-
spokesman-says-device-found-on-white-house-grounds-poses-no-threat.print.html.
31. David E. Graham, The U.S. Employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) and Abandonment of Applicable International Norms, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV.
675, 676–78 (2015).
32. Yin, supra note 27, at 641; Graham, supra note 31, at 679.
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govern its use against those who threaten U.S. national security inter-
ests, it is an uncertainty of our own making.33
Graham provides significant background on the current state of
UAVs as a weapons platform and notes that the UAV “is simply one
of any number of weapon platforms” available to the United States.34
Graham asserts that criticism of U.S. drone use has never been about
the legitimacy of the platform, but the legal basis on which its use is
authorized.  Graham explores the development of the U.S. legal justi-
fications for drone use and its targeting of certain individuals and pro-
vides a critique of the underlying analysis.  Graham suggests that
existing international legal principles and frameworks regulating a
State’s use of force provide sufficient legal basis for our actions, but
that our own hesitancy and legal analyses have led to uncertainty
about their legitimacy.  According to Graham, the existing legal
framework and principles can work so long as the United States does
not “ignore[ ], misinterpret[ ], or misappl[y]” them.35
IV. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE36 & INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN
THE 21ST CENTURY
According to the 2013 National Security Assessment, approxi-
mately 13% of the Intelligence Community’s budget went to “counter
weapons proliferation.”37  As detailed in the National Security Assess-
ment, the intelligence community—particularly the NSA and CIA—
have taken a more aggressive approach to asymmetric threats like
cyber security by not simply “spying” on foreign systems and entities
trying to infiltrate U.S. interests, but proactively hacking foreign com-
33. Graham, supra note 31, at 679.
34. Id. at 678; see also Yin, supra note 27, at 638–40; Chris Jenks, Law From
Above:  Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 85
N.D. L. REV. 649, 652–53 (2009) (explaining that the Department of Defense defines
UAV as “a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerody-
namic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can
be expendable or recoverable, and carries a lethal or nonlethal payload” (citation
omitted)).
35. Graham, supra note 31, at 679.
36. Asymmetric warfare or asymmetric armed conflict can be defined as involving
a “State on the one hand and a non-State entity on the other.”  David E. Graham,
The Law of Armed Conflict in Asymmetric Urban Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L LAW
STUD. 301, 302 (2011); see also FRANKLIN B. MILES, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE:  AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (1999) (setting forth DOD and CIA definitions of
asymmetric warfare and noting that their commonalities include pitting one’s
strengths against an opponent’s weaknesses and using “unexpected, unconventional,
or innovative methods of attack or defense”), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view
&did=439201.
37. Gellman & Miller, supra note 17; see also 1 FISCAL YEAR 2009: CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, U.S. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE 9 fig.1 (2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/164056434/FY-2013-
Congressional-Budget-Justification.
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puter networks to either obtain more data from them or sabotage
them altogether.38
General Vincent R. Stewart, the director of the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency observed during testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, “The theft of intellectual property is as old as the
world itself.  Now we are just doing it in cyber space.”39  In today’s
world, the United States must now recognize that “nation states are
trying to damage our networks [and access our intellectual property]”
every day; “the challenge is how to see the threat more discretely. . . .
We don’t see the threat early enough.”40 As Mark S. Chandler, Acting
Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented, the
cyber environment is so complex that early detection of cyber threats
is hard but absolutely necessary.41
Intelligence gathering has always been as much about knowing
one’s allies as one’s enemies.  In the international arena, however, this
accepted custom does not come without cost.  The National Security
Assessment outlines in great detail foreign states that have been iden-
tified as top targets for intelligence gathering.  The list includes allies
such as Israel and Pakistan.  The proliferation of recent “big data”
disclosures have made clear that even allies such as Germany do not
escape notice by the intelligence communities.  As General Mayfield
observed during his testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, today’s demand for intelligence is insatiable.
Thus one question considered by Symposium participants is
whether the existing international legal framework is able to adapt to
and curtail rapidly developing threats from surveillance and cyber
espionage.
V. EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGY & THE LAW: ARE WE KEEPING
UP WITH THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION?
It really began with the discovery of the double helix in the 1950s: a
revolution in biotechnology that has brought with it the prospect of
38. Gellman & Miller, supra note 17; see also Worldwide Threats Before the H.
Armed Servs Comm., 114th Cong. 22 (Feb. 3, 2015) (statement of Lieutenant General
Vincent Mayfield, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) (noting that the “absence
of universally acceptable and enforceable norms in cyberspace” contribute to threats
to cybersecurity and, as a result, “states worldwide are forming ‘cyber command’ or-
ganizations and developing national capabilities”), available at http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/AS/AS00/20150203/102880/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-StewartUSMCV-2015
0203.pdf
39. Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, House Armed Services Committee on
Worldwide Threats (Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.
cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=9894B134-0765-484C-AB5F-882D4410AC
D2.
40. Id.
41. Mark S. Chandler, House Armed Services Committee on Worldwide Threats
(Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display
?ContentRecord_id=9894B134-0765-484C-AB5F-882D4410ACD2.
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great advancements in human health and the potential for great harm.
“Biotechnology is one of the world’s fastest growing commercial sec-
tors.”42  As it relates to national security, biotechnology that has a
“dual use”43 provides both the potential for use as part of a country’s
strategic arsenal44 and great harm to the citizenry.  The United States
government’s oversight of such technology “is aimed at preserving the
benefits of life sciences research while minimizing the risk of misuse of
the knowledge, information, products, or technologies provided by
such research.”45  The literal explosion in the fields of biotechnology,
and our experiences with the anthrax attacks in 2001 and the Ebola
scare of 2014, raise significant questions about the capability of our
existing national security and legal frameworks to protect and adapt
to the ever-increasing field of biotechnology.
In her piece, Emerging Biotechnologies and the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention:  Can It Keep Up with the Biotechnology Revolu-
tion?,  Dr. Victoria Sutton explores the growth of biotechnology and
the legal structures designed to regulate it—specifically the 1972 Bio-
logical Weapons Convention.  Dr. Sutton sets forth the history of the
Convention and notes that even in its earliest days, States were con-
cerned about “dual use” biotechnologies and the possibility of harm
arising from the good in the biotechnology revolution46 but that, for
the most part, States believed the Convention was sufficient to pre-
vent the misuse of biotechnology for biowarfare.47
42. James J. Carafano & Andrew Gudgel, National Security and Biotechnology:
Small Science with Big Potential, rep. no. 2055, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 23,
2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/07/national-security-and-bio
technology-small-science-with-a-big-potential.
43. According to the National Institutes of Health, “dual use research of concern”
is defined as—
life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasona-
bly anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies
that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad po-
tential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other
plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
Biosecurity: Dual Use Research Concerns, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF SCI.
POLICY, http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-activities/biosecurity/dual-use-re
search-concern (last visited June 15, 2015) [hereinafter Biosecurity: Dual Use Re-
search Concerns].
44. See Carafano & Gudgel, supra note 42, at 4 (“Before 2001, the Department of
Defense (DOD) was the primary arm of the federal government [—] funding biologi-
cal defense and research related to national security.”).
45. See Biosecurity: Dual Use Research Concerns, supra note 43.
46. See Victoria Sutton, Emerging Biotechnologies and the 1972 Biological Weap-
ons Convention: Can it Keep Up with the Biotechnology Revolution?, 2 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 695, 699 (2015) (discussing State party observations in 1980 about the role of the
Convention in monitoring and regulating dual use developments including “genetic
engineering).
47. Id. at 700 (noting that the 1980 review of the Convention concluded that it was
sufficient to cover emerging technologies and not susceptible to covert violation or
bypass and explaining that, in fact, countries like the former Soviet Union were ac-
tively engaged in practices that violated the Convention).
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Dr. Sutton traces the subsequent meetings of the States with respect
to the Convention explaining that at each meeting, the States agreed
that the Convention “applies to all scientific and technological devel-
opments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to
[it].”48  As Dr. Sutton explains, the emerging complexity of the bio-
technology sphere has likewise increased the complexity and coverage
of the Convention.  For example, Dr. Sutton questions whether Arti-
cle I of the Convention covers “invasive species” (as it does cover
genetically modified mammals and insects) and the implications of us-
ing invasive species as a form of biological weapon.  She also suggests
that despite the ever-expanding definition of technologies covered by
the Convention, bionanotechnologies and nanobiotechnologies (fields
involving materials so small that they are invisible to the naked eye)
may literally escape notice under the Convention.  For example, Dr.
Sutton notes that if the material lacks sufficient biological compo-
nents, it would not fit the Convention’s definition and thus remain a
very real threat.49  Dr. Sutton also suggests that advancements in cer-
tain physiological and psychological substances, currently part of the
military’s biotechnology, may fall outside the scope of the
Convention.50
Dr. Sutton’s piece also explains that with this rapidly increasing
field of biotechnology comes the need for more “verification proto-
cols” and “confidence building measures,” calls for which are increas-
ing from those States without robust biotechnology industries.51  She
suggests that the Convention’s definition of covered materials is now
so broad that the plain meaning articulated in 1972 may be lost and, as
such, significant threats from emerging technologies may go unde-
tected.  As a result, Dr. Sutton suggests that the existing legal frame-
work should be re-evaluated.52
VI. MASS SURVEILLANCE & ITS IMPACT ON
PRIVACY AND COMMUNITY
Perhaps it is the open—if somewhat forced—acknowledgement
that we are, in fact, gathering information on everyone all the time
that has some questioning what national security really means.  Have
we in a post-9/11 world surrendered all of the ideals and core values,
including our belief in the sanctity of privacy to the interests of na-
tional security?  Does the right to privacy remain the bedrock of this
nation’s government and society?  In this age of Snapchat, Twitter,
Facebook, and Instagram through which we can literally update every-
one in the world about our actions, likes, fears, and dreams twenty-
48. Id. at 708 (quoting the Seventh Review Conference Report of 2011).
49. Id. at 716–18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 713.
52. Id. at 718.
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four hours a day, what does privacy mean?  And how do we weigh
privacy against national security? Wagner and Finkelman, discussed
supra, address both of these issues and note that the physical world of
letters, books, newspapers, and “virtually anything else that once ex-
isted as paper or plastic are now digital files that are stored and
downloaded.”53  This digital age raises the question not only whether
there is “privacy” but privacy from whom?54
In their piece, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism, and Kyllo:
How Intelligence Programs and Social Norms are Affecting the Fourth
Amendment, Adam Pearlman and Erick Lee address the “legal quan-
daries” created by advanced technology and our ever-growing depen-
dence on web-based social networking.55  From tort law to intellectual
property, traditional-legal frameworks have expanded to encompass
the impact of social media.  Pearlman and Lee note that criminal law
and national security have been extraordinarily impacted by the
growth of social media.  On the one hand, social media has provided
the government an expansive new tool and resource for the detection
of criminal activity, but on the other hand, it seems that the collection
of mass data and other information has resulted in a world in which
the citizenry have no privacy at all.  Pearlman and Lee attempt to
strike a balance between government use of social media and the citi-
zenry’s desire for “privacy,” and suggest that privacy is—and perhaps
always has been—a “legal fiction” but is one that should be protected
to the extent possible, even as people seem more willing to give up
their privacy on social media.56
In their piece, Pearlman and Lee trace the history of the Fourth
Amendment and the development of both the legal framework for
and society’s notion of the “right to privacy” in the context of advanc-
ing technologies, specifically noting that some of the earliest Supreme
Court decisions in this area recognized “that Congress and the laws
must be malleable enough to adapt to legal realities in a changing
world”57 but explaining that the history of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence and the “right to privacy” has been neither straight nor easy.
Pearlman and Lee then show the parallel growth of mass surveillance
and national security and the attempts of our legal frameworks to
keep up, noting that as technology evolves and external threats mate-
rialize, society seems more willing to give up some “privacy” for the
betterment of “national security.”  Pearlman and Lee then conclude
that society’s willingness to sacrifice “privacy” both in our growing
53. Abraham R. Wagner & Paul Finkelman, Security, Privacy, and Technology
Development: The Impact on National Security, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 597, 612 (2015).
54. Id. at 612–13, 619.
55. Adam R. Pearlman & Erick S. Lee, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism,
and Kyllo: How Intelligence Programs and Social Norms are Affecting the Fourth
Amendment, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 719, 720 (2015).
56. Id. at 723.
57. Id. at 726 (internal citation omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL403.txt unknown Seq: 14  7-MAR-16 14:45
594 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
reliance on social media and its pervasiveness in every aspect of life
and in our willingness to give law enforcement more access has funda-
mentally changed what a “reasonable” expectation of privacy is in the
21st century.
Sahar Aziz considers all of the questions raised during this Sympo-
sium in her concluding remarks.  She specifically targets the questions
in the context of the impact of overbroad surveillance and other intel-
ligence gathering activity domestically and internationally, and she
particularly highlights the travails faced by Muslim communities since
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.58  Aziz explores these interrelated themes of
national security, community, and privacy and suggests that much of
what we are doing in the name of national security is actually detri-
mental not only to our national security interests but those core values
on which our government is supposed to be based.
She remarks on the rise of the national security industrial complex
and explains that domestic and international surveillance activities
and anti-terrorism programs have resulted in stereotypes, particularly
of Muslim communities, created negative attention for them, and ulti-
mately, not been effective in identifying or preventing terrorist at-
tacks.59  She further explains how overbroad surveillance activity, and
racial profiling in the counterterrorism contexts create a culture of
fear that prevents “our government’s ability to provide equal protec-
tion under the law to all persons” and can lead, as did the govern-
ment’s deeply flawed policies of domestic Japanese internment during
World War II, to the compromise of “our nation’s rule of law.”60  Pro-
fessor Aziz reminds us most eloquently that we must be vigilant in our
consideration of national security interests and mindful of the very
real possibility that internal threats to our civil liberties may be equal
to or greater than external threats to our security interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
No matter what the new national security “threat” or technology
may be, it is wise to remember that every age is “unique in its combi-
nation of conditions, issues, and personalities; . . . a profound revolu-
tion in technologies, beliefs, or in social or political organization [may
seem] to sever us from history . . . [b]ut history as the educated mem-
ory of what has gone before is a resource not to be abandoned
58. See Sahar F. Aziz, Security and Technology: Rethinking National Security, 2
TEX. A&M L. REV. 791, 793–95 (2015) [hereinafter Aziz, Rethinking National
Security].
59. Id.; see also Sahar Aziz, Did Religious Profiling Allow Paris Terrorists to Pro-
ceed Undetected?, HUFFINGTON POST: WORLDPOST (Jan. 9, 2015), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/sahar-aziz/did-religious-profiling-allow-paris-terrorists-to-
proceed-undetected_b_6435812.html.
60. Aziz, Rethinking National Security, supra note 58, at 794.
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lightly.”61  With respect to a nation’s security and its relations with
other states, “the present always has a past dimension, which it is bet-
ter to acknowledge than ignore or deny.”62  Thus, the articles con-
tained in this Symposium Edition significantly contribute to the
discussion of national security by exploring the advent of new technol-
ogies and threats in the context of our established legal frameworks
and addressing the question: How do we think about national security?
This special Symposium Edition and the issues, challenges, and solu-
tions discussed therein contribute significantly to the review currently
being undertaken of our national security strategy.
The Texas A&M Law Review is extraordinarily grateful to the
presenters and authors who have contributed to this special edition
and to the greater dialogue about national security and its legal
frameworks.
61. MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY, supra note 20, at 8.
62. Id.
